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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous forgiveness research has mostly focused on victims’ forgiveness for transgressors, and 
variables expected to promote forgiveness, such as transgressors’ repentance and atonement, 
have been collectively branded as apology. However, decisions concerning forgiveness 
frequently occur outside of dyadic contexts, and the unique roles of repentance and atonement in 
achieving forgiveness, despite their preeminence in theology and law, have received little 
empirical attention. Across four experiments (N=601), we show that repentance and atonement 
independently promote third-party forgiveness for a variety of harms, even without direct 
apology and even in disinterested contexts. Our findings provide a systematic examination of 
third-party forgiveness disentangled from personal involvement, resulting in a clearer 
understanding of components facilitating forgiveness. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Forgiveness among relatives and friends is commonly depicted in classical and modern 
literature (e.g., King Lear, The Brothers Karamazov), and religious scholars and contemporary 
psychologists have widely investigated the art and science of forgiveness. Forgiveness helps 
repair damaged personal relationships, but people also evaluate whether a stranger who has 
harmed other strangers should be forgiven. Although the ultimate decision to forgive may be 
reserved for involved parties, such as victims and their close others, uninvolved and unharmed 
third parties may experience a similar process of forgiveness or unforgiveness. This question of 
forgivability permeates distance and time such that upon hearing news of school shootings, hate 
crimes, or international conflicts, perceivers outside of harmed communities ponder, even 
generations later, whether these offenders deserve to be forgiven. One Love Manchester, for 
example, attracted emotional and financial support worldwide—a poignant reminder that even 
when revenge and punishment may seem adaptive, uninvolved third parties wish to promote 
healing and forgiveness.  
 Forgiveness has been described as the process by which negative reactions toward 
offenders (i.e., avoidance and revenge) are transformed into prosocial motivations (McCullough, 
Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson, 2001). Supporting this idea, empirical evidence has demonstrated 
when and why victims forgive transgressors, and physiological and social benefits of forgiveness 
for both parties have been documented (e.g., Harris & Thoresen, 2005; Lawler et al., 2003; 
Witvliet, Ludwig, & Vander Laan, 2001). However, disinterested third-party observers also 
make social and moral judgments about interpersonal transgressions despite having no 
connection to victims or offenders. People experience negative emotions (e.g., moral outrage) 
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even when they are not the direct or indirect victims of injustice (e.g., Montada & Schneider, 
1989; Skarlicki, Ellard, & Kelln, 1998). Uninvolved third parties are even willing to boycott, 
protest against, or speak ill of offenders in response to their mistreatment of others (e.g., the 
#MeToo movement). In these cases, personally unharmed third-party observers are willing to 
incur costs to punish offenders. Given our knowledge of how third-party punishment helps 
maintain large-scale cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006) and how 
transgressions have impacts beyond victim-transgressor dyads, understanding third parties’ 
forgiving (rather than punishing) responses to transgressions is an understudied topic that is 
worthy of research.  
 Past forgiveness research has identified post-transgression factors that facilitate 
forgiveness such as apology, remorse, and restitution primarily within victim-transgressor dyads 
(e.g., McCullough et al., 1998; Zechmeister, Garcia, Romero, & Vos, 2004). For victims, the 
decision to forgive hinges on future exploitation risk and relationship value of the offender, and 
offenders who successfully display relational commitment (e.g., conciliatory behavior) and 
reduce the perceived likelihood of future threat (e.g., sincere apology) attain victims’ forgiveness 
(McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2013). Yet, little is known about whether these gestures—
which provide no direct benefit for third parties—also influence forgiveness judgments from 
uninvolved observers. When relational value and future harm are not at stake, can repentance and 
atonement still redeem offenders and restore their damaged reputations? Using a person-
perception approach, we demonstrate an uninvolved third-party forgiveness (U3PF) effect, 
whereby disinterested observers, who have no motivated reason to care, promote forgiveness 
based on offenders’ post-transgression attitudes (e.g., repentance) and actions (e.g., atonement).  
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 “Involved” vs. “Uninvolved” Third Parties 
  As noted above, most past interpersonal forgiveness research has concentrated on 
victim-transgressor dyads (e.g., Boon & Sulsky, 1997; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 
1997; McCullough et al., 1998). One exception is third-party forgiveness research involving 
cases where offenders seek forgiveness from victims’ family members or communities. Learning 
that someone close has been harmed can be painful; close friends or relatives of victims are less 
forgiving than victims, despite not being directly harmed (Green, Burnette, & Davis, 2008). 
Although third-party forgiveness characterized by indirect harm helps us understand how 
involved (but not directly victimized) people forgive, judgments regarding forgivability are also 
made by people completely unconnected to transgressions. For example, people evaluate the 
behavior of athletes (e.g., Lance Armstrong), politicians (e.g., Bill Clinton), actors (e.g., Kevin 
Spacey), or criminals (e.g., mass-shooters) and decide whether these people deserve forgiveness 
for their (alleged) misdeeds. This impersonal judgment is U3PF.  
 Unlike victims or involved third parties—the targets of previous forgiveness research, 
uninvolved observers have no agendas to uphold, and no obvious motivations underscoring their 
decisions about whether forgiveness is deserved. Therefore, post-transgression behaviors such as 
apology or offers of restitution provide no apparent benefit for uninvolved observers. Moreover, 
whereas forgiveness from involved parties depends on desire for reconciliation, costs of 
retaliation, and avoiding further harm (McCullough et al., 2013), uninvolved third parties are 
likely unconcerned with these issues. On what basis, then, will uninvolved observers make 
judgments about forgivability? Apart from work on public confession (e.g., Weiner, Graham, 
Peter, & Zmuidinas, 1991; Gold & Weiner, 2000) and victim-observer asymmetries in 
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discriminating apology sincerity (Risen & Gilovich, 2007; Hashimoto & Karasawa, 2012; 2016), 
no forgiveness studies to our knowledge have tackled this subject.  
 Although relationship maintenance is not relevant for uninvolved observers who arguably 
lack “standing” to grant forgiveness, one reason to study U3PF is that related moral judgments 
such as punishment and blame frequently accompany disinterested bystander evaluations (e.g., 
Alicke, 1992; Laurent, Nuñez, & Schweitzer, 2015; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 
2010). Overlap between blame, punishment, and forgivability exists, but these constructs are 
conceptually distinct. For example, although blame and forgivability both depend on 
transgression severity, blameworthiness relies on agents’ pre-transgression mental states (e.g., 
intentions and reasons for acting; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014), and forgiveness—which 
relies on offenders’ post-transgression attitudes and behaviors—is a reasonable response only 
after a transgressor has been justifiably blamed (Adams, Zou, Inesi, & Pillutla, 2015). Despite 
these conceptual differences, studies of perceived forgivability have been surprisingly neglected 
in the field, and gaining insight into the factors that promote forgiveness from uninvolved third 
parties is informative beyond what we know about blame, punishment, and forgiveness from 
victims.   
 Exploring U3PF allows a clearer view of how people think about forgiveness when no 
reconciliation concerns exist (Fincham, Paleari, & Regalia, 2002; Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & 
Hannon, 2002). For example, unharmed observers, with no motivation to seek revenge or fear 
counter-retaliation, may perceive offenders who display remorse and/or offer restitution to 
victims as worthy future cooperation partners who deserve forgiveness. That is, if forgiveness is 
a cognitive adaptation for maintaining existing cooperative relationships between involved 
parties (McCullough et al., 2013), then recognizing repentance and atonement from offenders 
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should be advantageous not only for harmed parties but also for uninvolved third-party observers 
seeking to build cooperation. Although the importance of offenders’ relational value may be 
disparaged in modern welfare systems (e.g., equality under the law), third-party intervention has 
been linked to adaptive strategies designed for small-scale interdependent environments of the 
past (Petersen, Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2012; Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016). 
Whereas repentance and atonement directly benefit involved parties in achieving reconciliation, 
we argue that the same mechanisms—perceived remorse and restitution—aid in transforming 
third parties’ negative perceptions of offenders (e.g., blame, punishment) into positive 
evaluations, through the process known as forgiveness (i.e., U3PF).     
Repentance and Atonement 
 The view that repentance and atonement are prerequisites for attaining forgiveness has a 
long tradition in theological thought. Jesus instructed his disciples to forgive if offenders repent 
(Luke 17:3), a sentiment also endorsed by John the Baptist (Matthew 3:2; 4:17). Likewise, the 
Jewish process of teshuvah, described in Maimonides’s Laws of Forgiveness, requires both 
repentance through public confession and atonement by compensating the victim (Rye et al., 
2000). Outside of Western religion, the idea of “making things right” is the centerpiece of the 
traditional Hawaiian conflict resolution strategy called ho’oponopono (Miura, 2000). 
 Repentance and atonement often co-occur with apology, a topic that has been studied 
alongside forgiveness (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Carlisle et al., 2012). Because repentance 
and atonement share conceptual overlap with apology, systematically disentangling the three is 
challenging. For example, atonement through monetary compensation may be perceived as an 
apology or expression of repentance. Likewise, sincere apologies imply that offenders feel bad 
about their actions. Consistent with this, past research has treated remorse and restitution as 
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forms of apology (e.g., Schlenker & Darby, 1981; Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009), but there are 
crucial differences between feeling bad about one’s actions (i.e., repentance) and behavior aimed 
at making amends (i.e., atonement). Here, we define repentance as negative emotion experienced 
by an offender—regret, guilt, and remorse—associated with acknowledgement of responsibility 
for a transgression (Eaton, Struthers, & Santelli, 2006; Schlenker & Darby, 1981). On the other 
hand, we define atonement as concrete actions by offenders to make amends, which encompass 
both behavioral attempts to “make things right” and the natural consequences of such efforts that 
typically result in restitution. In sum, repentance involves transgressors’ internal states (that may 
be communicated), atonement is about observable behaviors directed toward (and typically 
resulting in) improving victims’ well-being, and apology falls somewhere in the middle.  
 Because no empirical research to our knowledge has focused on distinctions between 
repentance and atonement, the apology literature helps in understanding the two constructs. 
Positive effects of apology on forgiveness have been documented in surveys about past 
transgressions (e.g., Davis & Gold, 2011; McCullough et al., 1997), experiments with 
hypothetical transgressions (e.g., Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009; Weiner et al., 1991), staged 
offenses (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989), and economic 
games (e.g., Fischbacher & Utikal, 2013; Ho, 2012). Evidence indicates that repentance leads to 
forgiveness (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Exline & Baumeister, 2000) by helping to validate 
victims and dissipate self-threat arising from experiences of devaluation caused by a 
transgression (Eaton et al., 2006; Scobie & Scobie, 1998). For example, remorse attribution 
reduced sentences for assault cases where harm was salient but not for administrative 
proceedings such as breach of confidentiality (Pipes & Alessi, 1999). If remorse conveys the lack 
of intention to impose further harm, offenders who repent may regain their positive image back 
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from uninvolved observers, even without direct apology to the victim. Alternatively, display of 
repentance may have diminished value for impartial third parties because they do not directly 
experience threat. Thus, we hypothesize that repentance will have a weak yet positive effect on 
U3PF. 
 Atonement, in the context of apology with offers of restitution, also has positive effects 
on forgiveness (e.g., Carlisle et al., 2012; Drell & Jaswal, 2016; Jeter & Brannon, 2017). 
Offenders’ post-transgression behavior to make amends will typically result in favorable 
outcomes for victims; however, victims value costly apologies even when they do not receive 
material compensation (Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009). Evidence from organizational, 
ethnographic, and animal behavior research also suggests that substantive penance or 
conciliatory gestures, even when they do not fully compensate the original transgression, can 
rebuild cooperation (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Boehm, 1984; de Waal, 
1989). Although atonement provides no material or emotional benefit for uninvolved observers, 
it nonetheless signifies offenders’ commitment to the wellbeing of others (McCullough et al., 
2013). Therefore, we hypothesize that atonement will have a strong positive effect on U3PF.  
The Current Research 
 Four experiments, using a variety of harms and relationships between victims and 
transgressors, tested the hypothesis that repentance and atonement independently promote U3PF. 
Experiment 1 examined whether communicating repentance would increase forgivability. 
Experiment 2 investigated the effects of atoning behavior on forgivability. Experiment 3’s story 
featured a physical harm and simultaneously manipulated repentance and atonement. Experiment 
4 used a new design allowing us to track how forgivability unfolded across an event and tested 
whether costliness of restitution mediated the effect of atonement on U3PF.  
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General Method: Participants 
 We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and 
all measures in the studies. Study 1’s sample size was determined based on a pilot study. In 
Studies 2-4, sample sizes were determined a priori using the criterion of 80% power (alpha = .05) 
to detect a medium-sized effect (d = 0.50). Participants were excluded from analyses for 
unusually short reading times or failure to respond correctly to one or more attention check 
items.1 Final sample sizes were n = 191 (Experiment 1), n = 111 (Experiment 2), n = 141 
(Experiment 3), and n = 158 (Experiment 4). All experiments were between-participants. 
Research was approved by the Institutional Review Board where data were collected. All 
participants provided informed consent prior to participation and demographic information after 
responding to primary measures. Participants were U.S. residents recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Table 1 lists demographic information for all studies.  
 
Table 1. Demographics (Experiments 1 to 4) 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
Final sample size 191 111 141 158 
Exclusion     
     Short reading time 11 3 0 6 
     Attention check miss 17 9 4 7 
Gender (% female) 46.6% 48.6% 57.4% 43.0% 
Age (M and SD) 35.97 38.86 38.28 36.41 
 (12.05) (12.92) (13.35) (10.45) 
Ethnicity     
    Asian/Asian American 12.3% 7.2% 6.4% 8.9% 
    Black/African American 8.0% 5.4% 4.3% 4.4% 
    Hispanic/Latino(a) 4.8% 7.2% 10.6% 5.1% 
    White/European American 70.1% 78.4% 75.2% 79.1% 
    Other 4.8% 1.8% 3.5% 2.5% 
                                                          
1 In Experiment 4, two participants with incomplete responses and 13 participants who had participated in the pilot 
study for Experiment 2 were excluded. For all studies, analyses that retained all participants did not differ 
substantively from those reported, except the effect of repentance on overall forgivability in Experiment 4 did not 
reach significance, and its effect on recovery was marginally significant. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Overview 
 Experiment 1 examined how communicating repentance affects perceived forgivability. 
Specifically, we tested whether expressing remorse to a victim, relative to not doing so, would 
influence U3PF. Although repentance and apology naturally co-occur, to isolate the effects of 
repentance from verbal apology, Experiment 1 tested whether communication of the offender’s 
mental state (i.e., feeling bad) can facilitate forgivability without apology. We hypothesized that 
participants would promote forgiveness for a repentant offender more than a non-repentant 
offender.  
Method  
 Procedure. Participants read a vignette about a senior in college who was failing a 
required course and who submitted an extra credit assignment that was then lost by a teaching  
assistant (TA).2 Participants were then randomly assigned to read one of two emails the TA 
wrote to the student. In the No Repent condition, the TA inadvertently left the student’s 
assignment in the copy room. In the Repent condition, the TA additionally acknowledged that it 
could affect the student’s grade and articulated remorse. Participants then responded to a series 
of questions. Unless otherwise noted, all reported items used 7-point scales ranging from 
1=entirely disagree to 7=entirely agree.  
   Measures. Agreement with four statements that the TA “was repentant,” “felt guilty,” 
“felt bad,” and “regretted what happened” assessed perceived remorse (α = .94), which served as 
manipulation check. Three items (α = .86) adapted from McCullough et al. (1998) measured 
                                                          
2 All vignettes are available in the Appendices. 
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forgivability: “Jamie (the student) should forgive the TA,” “Despite what the TA did, Jamie 
should have compassion for him,” and “Jamie should let go of any anger she may feel toward the 
TA.” To explore whether participants inferred apology or atonement from the repentance 
manipulation, we asked two binary-response questions: “Did the TA apologize to Jamie for 
losing her assignment?” and “Did the TA make amends to atone for losing Jamie’s assignment?” 
An additional item assessed transgression severity: “How severe was the impact of what the TA 
did?” (1=not at all severe to 7=very severe).  
Results and Discussion  
 R codes and data for all studies are available at https://osf.io/6jqky. As expected, remorse 
was higher in the Repent condition (M = 4.86, SD = 1.32) than the No Repent condition (M = 
3.63, SD = 1.52), t(189) = 5.94,  p < .001, d = 0.86, demonstrating that the repentance 
manipulation was successful. As hypothesized, forgivability was higher in the Repent condition 
(M = 4.33, SD = 1.34) than in the No Repent condition (M = 3.82, SD = 1.53), t(189) = 2.43, p = 
.016, CI.95 = [0.10, 0.92],
3 d = 0.35, showing that even in a disinterested context, repentance 
promoted a belief that a transgressor deserved forgiveness. Offense severity did not differ 
significantly across conditions, (Mrepent = 6.21, SDrepent = 0.88; Mno repent = 6.06, SDno repent = 1.24), 
t(179) = 0.89, p = .376, ruling out the possibility that the observed difference in forgivability was 
due to condition-based differences in perceived severity of the offense.4 When asked whether the 
TA apologized, 74.4% of participants in the Repent condition and 29.9% in the No Repent 
condition responded with “yes,” and this difference was significant, χ2(1) = 35.32, p < .001,  = 
0.45. However, the proportions of participants indicating that the TA atoned (13.3% in Repent 
                                                          
3 All reported CIs represent the lower and upper bounds of the difference between means. 
 
4 The degrees of freedom for offense severity were 179 because 10 participants’ responses to the transgression 
severity item were not recorded due to a technical error.  
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and 14.4% in No Repent) were statistically equal, χ2(1) = 0.00, p = .996,  = -0.02. Experiment 1 
showed that repentance promoted U3PF. Additionally, although the TA’s email did not contain 
direct apology, people inferred apology (but not atonement) from expression of repentance, 
suggesting that uninvolved third parties differentiate repentance from atonement.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Overview 
 Experiment 2 explored the role of atonement, defined as an offender’s post-transgression 
behavior directed toward alleviating the consequences of an offense. We believe that concrete 
actions aimed at repair are what primarily influence U3PF rather than differences in outcome 
that naturally result from these actions. Experiment 2 tests this idea of atoning action as a social 
signal by manipulating an agent’s attempt to atone while holding constant the (negative) 
outcome resulting from the transgression across conditions. We hypothesized that relative to an 
offender who does not attempt to make amends, uninvolved third parties will view an offender 
who tries but fails to atone as deserving greater forgiveness.  
Method  
 Procedure. Participants read a story about a well-qualified bank employee who did not 
get a promotion because her supervisor failed to submit a promised letter of recommendation. 
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two versions of the story’s ending. In the 
Atone condition, the supervisor explained her oversight to the hiring manager and asked her to 
reconsider the employee’s application. Though her application was reviewed, the employee 
ultimately did not get the position. In the No Atone condition, the supervisor did not actively 
seek to fix the situation despite conversing with the same hiring manager, and the employee did 
not get the position. To isolate the atonement manipulation, no explicit mention of repentance 
was made; in both versions, no apology was offered and no description of the supervisor’s 
feelings about the transgression was given. Participants then responded to questions about the 
story.  
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 Measures. As manipulation check, attempted restitution (α = .98) was measured with 
four items: “Kayce (the supervisor)…” “tried to atone for not submitting Maya’s (the 
employee’s) letter on time,” “tried to ‘make things right’ after failing to send the hiring 
committee her letter,” “attempted to correct her mistake of not sending the letter for Maya,” and 
“wanted to fix the problem her oversight had caused.” Forgivability (α = .87) was measured 
using the same three items from Experiment 1 with names changed to match the new vignette.  
Results and Discussion 
 As expected, attempted restitution was higher in the Atone condition (M = 6.27, SD = 
0.93) than the in No Atone condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.77), t(109)= 9.34,  p < .001, d = 1.77. 
Mean forgivability was also higher in the Atone condition (M = 5.63, SD = 0.96) than the No 
Atone condition (M = 4.35, SD = 1.38), t(109) = 5.71, p < .001, CI.95 = [0.84, 1.73], d = 1.08. 
The strong effect of atonement on forgivability suggests a robust connection between actions 
directed toward “making things right” and deservingness of forgiveness without communicated 
apology or repentance. Consistent with the idea of signaling cooperation commitment, this 
suggests that the action of trying to atone—even when this attempt fails—makes a transgressor 
seem more forgivable to uninvolved third parties. Though attempt at repair should typically 
result in positive outcomes by design, the outcome here remained unfavorable for the victim in 
both conditions. Thus, Experiment 2 showed that an attempt to atone was sufficient for 
influencing U3PF.   
 One issue worth consideration is that in both Experiments 1 and 2, offenders had power 
over victims. People may be compelled to promote forgiveness with little effort from offenders if 
the cost of not forgiving is amplified by a power status difference (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001). 
Third parties’ forgivability evaluations may therefore have been influenced by the consideration 
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that not forgiving could lead to further disadvantages to the victim. To address this, Experiment 
3 investigated the effects of repentance and atonement when the transgressor and victim have 
equal status. To increase our ability to generalize, we also used a new vignette involving physical 
harm.    
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Overview 
 In many contexts, actions aimed at atonement might accompany repentance. In fact, 
feeling bad about a transgression might lead offenders to atone, particularly if repentance alone 
is insufficient to obtain forgiveness. In Experiment 3, repentance and atonement were 
manipulated within the same design. To focus solely on the offender’s internal response, the 
repentance manipulation in Experiment 3 reflected the offender’s private thoughts that were not 
communicated to the victim. We hypothesized that both repentance and atonement would 
increase perceived forgivability and that atonement, which signals offenders’ behavioral 
commitment to cooperation, would produce a stronger effect than repentance. We explored 
whether the manipulations would work synergistically to influence forgivability (i.e., 
interactions) or exert additive effects but had no predictions.  
Method 
 Procedure. Participants read a vignette divided into two parts. Part 1 introduced a 
college student (Jesse) who, while riding his bike one night, was hit by a car driven by a 
classmate (Chris). The bike was damaged and after Jesse claimed to be fine, Chris drove away. 
Later, Jesse realized he was seriously injured and received emergency surgery on his knee. The 
next day, Chris learned about Jesse’s injury and the repentance manipulation was embedded in 
the following narrative: 
 Repent. Hearing this, Chris felt terrible about himself. He thought to himself, “Poor 
Jesse. It was my fault this happened, wasn’t it? […] Jesse would be here right now if I was 
driving more carefully.”  
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 No Repent. Hearing this, Chris didn’t feel particularly bad. He thought to himself, “I 
don’t know why he’s blaming me for what happened […] and it’s not my fault I couldn’t stop in 
time.”  
 Part 2 described a meeting between the two a few months after the accident and 
contained the atonement manipulation. In the Atone condition, participants read that Chris 
bought a new bike for Jesse at the cost of denying himself the purchase of a wanted item. In the 
No Atone condition, Chris bought the item he had intended to purchase for himself, and Jesse 
bought the bike himself. Perceived remorse was measured between Part 1 and Part 2, and 
remaining measures were collected after Part 2.  
 Measures. The four remorse items from Experiment 1 (α = .97) were used to check the 
repentance manipulation. Four restitution items (α = .97) assessed the atonement manipulation: 
“Chris…” “atoned for the damage he caused Jesse,” “tried to make amends to Jesse,” “repaired 
the harm he had caused Jesse,” and “made up for his earlier actions.” Forgivability (α = .85) was 
measured with three items: “Jesse should forgive Chris for what happened,” “Jesse should let go 
of any anger he may feel toward Chris,” and “Chris deserves to be forgiven for what he did.” 5 
Results and Discussion  
 Manipulation check. Because atonement was manipulated after the measure of remorse 
was collected (and thus, atonement could not influence remorse), a t-test was used to examine 
differences in remorse as a function of repentance. Predictably, remorse was higher (M = 6.18, 
SD = 0.74) in the Repent condition than in the No Repent condition (M = 2.16, SD = 1.25), 
t(139) = 23.22, p < .001, d = 3.91. For all other means analyses, 2 (No Repent/Repent)  2 (No 
                                                          
5 In addition to our primary measure of interest (i.e., U3PF), several related constructs were measured in 
Experiments 3 and 4. To keep the focus solely on U3PF, those variables and associated analyses are reported only in 
the Appendices.  
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Atone/Atone) ANOVAs with 1, 137 df were used. Restitution was perceived as higher in the 
Atone condition (M = 5.70, SD = 1.00) than in the No Atone condition (M = 1.67, SD = 0.99), F 
= 572.05, p < .001, d = 4.05. No main effect of repentance (p = .650) or interaction of atonement 
and repentance (p = .198) was found on restitution.  
 Forgivability. As hypothesized, participants in the Repent condition indicated higher 
forgivability (M = 4.83, SD = 1.33) than participants in the No Repent condition (M = 4.39, SD = 
1.63), F = 10.26, p = .002, CI.95 = [0.05, 0.83], d = 0.30. Similarly, participants in the Atone 
condition indicated higher forgivability (M = 5.48, SD = 1.03) than participants in the No Atone 
condition (M = 3.72, SD = 1.39), F = 83.75, p < .001, CI.95 = [1.37, 2.15], d = 1.44. The 
interaction was not significant (p = .098).  
 Experiment 3 replicated our findings from Experiments 1 and 2, further showing that 
repentance and atonement work independently to influence perceived forgivability. Notably, 
repentance still influenced forgivability even when the offender did not communicate his 
remorse or directly apologize to the victim, highlighting that uninvolved third parties are 
sensitive to offenders’ mental states. As hypothesized, atonement had a much stronger effect on 
forgivability than repentance. Experiment 3 critically demonstrated that atonement increases 
perceived forgivability even when it does not fully restore the victim to a pre-transgression state 
(e.g., replacing the bike does not heal the physical wound or pay for any associated health care 
costs), corroborating the conclusion from Experiment 2 that atonement effects are not driven 
solely by outcome. Finally, Experiment 3 demonstrated the effects of repentance and atonement 
on U3PF in a new context where harm was physical, fairly severe, and involved people similar in 
power status.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 4 
Overview 
 Despite finding consistent effects of repentance and atonement on forgivability in 
Experiments 1-3, questions remain about whether uninvolved third-party perceptions of 
transgressors can be truly restored. Although repentance and atonement may function to mend 
damaged relationships with the direct recipients of such reconciliatory gestures (i.e., victims or 
those close to victims), for uninvolved observers, repentance, atonement, or the combination of 
the two may not fully restore offenders to the moral status they originally enjoyed before 
committing the offense. Just as certain transgressions can leave scars or lingering bitterness 
within victims, offenders may suffer permanent reputational damage from those who witness 
their offenses. Even when reconciliation with victims is achieved, redemption may not extend 
beyond the victim to individuals who dispassionately judge the transgression. Thus, repentance 
and atonement may serve as attempts to undo the damage wrought, in hopes of full restoration in 
the eyes of those they have wronged as well as others who are aware of their misdeeds.  
 Experiment 4 again manipulated both repentance and atonement, using a new context 
involving a workplace transgression affecting a coworker and his girlfriend. To assess how U3PF 
unfolds across an event, the vignette was presented in three parts. The negative event was first 
described (Part 1), followed by a description of the transgression (Part 2), followed by 
manipulations of repentance and atonement (Part 3). This new design (Figure 1) allowed us to 
systematically measure forgivability post-event at Time 1 (T1), post-transgression at Time 2 
(T2), and post-manipulations at Time 3 (T3).  
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Figure 1. Diagram showing the 3-part design of Experiment 4. Forgivability was measured after 
each time point. 
 
 In addition to hypotheses about main effects of repentance and atonement on T3 
forgivability (H1), we made several additional predictions. First, we predicted that relative to T1 
(baseline), forgivability would decrease after the transgression was described at T2 (H2). Next, 
we expected “recovery” (i.e., increased forgivability) from T2 to T3 as a function of repentance 
and atonement (H3). Last, for restoration of forgivability (i.e., T3 as compared with T1), we 
expected to find only a main effect of atonement (H4a) and that restoration would be “complete” 
(i.e., back to T1 forgivability) only when the transgressor atoned (H4b).  Because the cost of 
making amends should be relevant when making forgiveness judgments (Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 
2009), we included a measure of perceived costliness as a possible mediator between atonement 
and forgivability. We predicted that atonement would affect forgivability through perceived 
costliness (H5), which might itself be mediated by restitution.   
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Method  
 Procedure. Participants read a story divided into three parts. In Part 1, Alex was forced 
to cover his coworker’s (Casey) shift, which led to Alex having to cancel an important date with 
his girlfriend to attend a concert on her birthday. In Part 2, it was revealed that Casey (offender) 
faked sickness to attend the same concert and that Alex (victim) discovers this. In Part 3, Casey 
either denied or communicated his repentance to Alex: 
 No Repent. Casey said, “To be honest, I don’t really feel bad about this. Maybe I should 
have asked for the night off ahead of time, but you could have said no to coming in. I really 
enjoyed the concert and I don’t regret calling in.”  
 Repent. Casey looked troubled and said, “I feel really bad about this. I never even 
considered that someone would have to cover my shift, but I should have and should have shown 
up to work yesterday. I know it doesn’t change what happened, but just so you know, I feel pretty 
bad about it.” 
 Next, participants read that a few weeks after the incident, Alex had plans with his 
girlfriend but requested the wrong day off and asked if Casey could cover his shift. Casey’s reply 
and subsequent action served as the atonement manipulation:  
 No Atone. Casey replied that he couldn’t because he had a friend coming in from out of 
town that night. “We already have plans to just hang out and relax tomorrow,” Casey said. “I 
really can’t. My friend is only going to be in town for a few days, so tomorrow really doesn’t 
work for me.”  
 Atone. Casey replied that he couldn’t because he had a friend coming in from out of town 
that night. “We already have plans to just hang out and relax,” Casey said, “so tomorrow really 
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doesn’t work.” At that point, Casey paused then said, “You know what, though? My friend will 
be in town for a few days, so I can cover for you.”  
 Immediately after each part of the story (i.e., at T1, T2, and T3), participants rated 
Casey’s forgivability. Remaining measures were assessed after Part 3. 
 Measures. The same four items from Experiment 1 assessed remorse (α = .98). 
Restitution (α = .99) was measured with the same four items from Experiment 3 with names and 
transgressions changed to match the new vignette. Forgivability was measured with two items 
(“Alex should forgive Casey,” and “Alex should let go of any anger he may feel toward Casey”) 
at each time point (T1 r = .87; T2 r = .73; T3 r = .87). To capture “recovery,” we subtracted T2 
forgivability scores from T3 (higher numbers indicate greater recovery from any damage that 
occurred in T2). To capture “restoration,” we subtracted T1 scores from T3 (higher numbers 
indicate greater restoration to pre-transgression forgivability levels).6 Perceived costliness (α = 
.83) was measured using three items: “Casey tried hard to help Alex,” “Covering Alex’s shift 
required a lot of effort on Casey’s part,” and “To what extent did Casey sacrifice other plans to 
help Alex?” (1=not enough at all, 7=more than enough). 
Results 
 For the hypothesis that following report of the transgression at T2, forgivability would 
decrease overall (H2), a paired-samples t-test examined differences in forgivability between T1 
and T2. Other hypotheses were examined using 2 (No Repent/Repent) × 2 (No Atone/Atone) 
ANOVAs with 1, 154 df.  
                                                          
6 Two focused hypotheses involved differences in forgivability at different time points: T3 (post-manipulations) 
relative to T2 (i.e., recovery) and to T1 (i.e., restoration). Thus, including all three levels of the within-participants 
(time) variable in one analysis would not provide an appropriate test of these hypotheses. With only two repeated 
measures, analyses of difference scores yield the same results as a mixed ANOVA, suggesting the appropriateness 
of this approach to ease interpretation of effects. 
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 Manipulation check. For remorse, main effects of repentance (F = 50.97, p < .001, d = 
0.82) and atonement (F = 161.20, p < .001, d = 1.82) were found. The interaction was not 
significant (p = .204). For restitution, main effects of atonement (F = 478.92, p < .001, d = 3.32) 
and repentance (F = 13.87, p < .001, d = 0.32) were found, as well as a significant interaction (F 
= 4.11, p = .044, η2 p = .03) that suggested the effects of atonement were slightly stronger when 
repentance was also present. Table 2 provides M and SD for all variables as a function of 
condition. 
 
Table 2 
Experiment 4: Means and standard deviations as a function of repentance and atonement 
 No Repent  Repent 
 No Atone Atone  No Atone Atone 
 M SD M SD  M SD M SD 
Remorse 1.49 1.00 4.06 1.83  2.81 1.60 5.95 1.03 
Restitution 1.39 0.97 5.05 1.50  1.70 1.05 6.11 1.02 
T1 Forgivability 4.91 1.49 4.95 1.81  5.21 1.75 4.87 1.77 
T2 Forgivability 2.33 1.43 2.29 1.51  2.61 1.57 1.96 1.46 
T3 Forgivability  3.14 1.45 4.93 1.72  3.54 1.76 5.54 1.39 
Recovery (T3 minus T2) 0.81 1.20 2.64 1.86  0.93 1.23 3.57 1.94 
Restoration (T3 minus T1) -1.77 1.34 -0.03 1.74  -1.67 2.05 0.67 1.74 
Costliness 1.97 0.85 3.83 1.53  2.12 0.92 4.50 1.28 
Cell N 39 40  38 41 
 
 Of interest, the effect size for remorse was larger as a function of atonement than of 
repentance, suggesting that actions aimed at making amends imply feeling bad about what one 
has done. To clarify these relationships, we examined the correlation between remorse and 
restitution (r = .84, p < .001) and then respectively tested the effects of repentance and atonement 
on remorse and restitution while controlling for the other variable using 2 (No Repent/Repent)  
2 (No Atone/Atone) ANCOVAs with 1, 153 df. While controlling restitution, atonement no 
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longer significantly predicted remorse (p = .245; interaction p = .934); repentance remained 
significant, F = 35.43, p < .001. Similarly, while controlling remorse, repentance and the 
interaction no longer predicted restitution (respectively, ps = .252, .120). Atonement remained 
significant, F = 156.97, p < .001. This confirmed that although remorse and restitution responses 
were strongly associated, each manipulation worked to influence the linked construct above and 
beyond that of the other. 
 Overall forgivability (T3). Supporting H1, atonement strongly predicted overall 
forgivability (F = 56.04, p < .001, CI.95 = [1.40, 2.40], d = 1.19). Repentance also predicted 
U3PF (F = 4.00, p = .047, CI.95 = [0.03, 1.03], d = 0.29), although this effect size was much 
smaller. The interaction was not significant, p = .674. 
 Damage, repair, and recovery. Confirming H2, a paired-samples t-test indicated that 
forgivability decreased at T2 (M = 2.29, SD = 1.50) from baseline (M = 4.98, SD = 1.70), t(157) 
= 18.80, p < .001, d = 1.68 (see Figure 2). As predicted (H3), repentance and atonement were 
both independently associated with recovery in forgivability following the transgression (i.e., T3 
minus T2), respectively, Fs = 4.33 and 76.69, p = .039 and p < .001, CIs.95 = [0.07, 1.07] and 
[1.74, 2.74], ds = 0.29 and 1.38. The interaction was not significant, F = 2.51, p = .115. Single 
sample t-tests of each cell against zero demonstrated recovery in each cell of the design, ts(37 to 
40) > 4.22, ps < .001, ds > 0.68. Finding that even without any repentance or atonement, there 
was some recovery following the manipulation—rather than a potential decrease in 
forgivability—is somewhat puzzling. Speculatively, the offender might have been seen as 
somewhat forgivable because (a) Casey’s counterfactual for the offense (i.e., suggesting Alex 
might have called in sick himself) created doubts about the severity of the offense, and (b) 
people considered it reasonable that Casey didn’t want to commit another offense by cancelling 
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plans with his friend. To address this, future research might describe a more serious offense 
where atonement does not require the potential commission of another offense against someone 
else.  
 
Figure 2. Forgivability across time in Experiment 4. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 Consistent with H4a, only atonement was associated with restoration of forgivability 
back to baseline (i.e., T3 minus T1), F = 54.64, p < .001, CI.95 = [1.55, 2.55], d = 1.17. Neither 
repentance (p = .153) nor the interaction (p = .281) was significant. Examination of cell means 
using single-sample t-tests showed that restoration was incomplete in both cells where Casey did 
not atone, ts(37, 38) < -5.01, ps < .001, ds > 0.81. However, supporting H4b, in the No 
Repent/Atone condition, the T3−T1 difference scores did not differ from zero, t(39) = 0.09, p = 
.928, d = 0.01, indicating that complete restoration had occurred. Unexpectedly, in the 
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Repent/Atone cell, there was more than complete restoration: People thought the offender 
deserved greater forgiveness than when they had no information about his transgression and 
might have assumed he was genuinely absent from work because of sickness, t(40) = 2.47, p = 
.018, d = 0.39. Although speculative, this suggests that unknowingly committing an offense, 
feeling bad about it, and making up for it display strong moral character to uninvolved observers.  
 Mediation.  Prior to testing mediation, we first tested whether atonement impacted the 
putative mediator, perceived costliness. Both repentance (F = 4.83, p = .029, d = 0.28) and 
atonement (F = 126.23, p < .001, d = 1.77) impacted costliness; the interaction was non-
significant (p = .174). Because costliness was affected by our repentance manipulation, we 
considered examining whether it might statistically mediate the effects of repentance on 
forgivability but did not test this for two reasons. First, this effect was unpredicted and lacked 
theoretical basis, making explanation of any statistically significant effect necessarily post-hoc 
and speculative. Second, absent atonement, repentance should not affect costliness because no 
effort was expended to help the victim in the No Atone cells. Confirming this, the simple effect 
of repentance on costliness when atonement was absent was not significant, t(75) = 0.78, p = 
.438. On the other hand, the simple effects of atonement on costliness were significant at both 
levels of repentance, ts(77) > 6.64, ps < .001. Thus, the main effect of repentance likely reflects a 
slight boost in perceived costliness when the offender not only expended effort but did so 
because he felt bad about causing harm. Given these findings, mediation tests focused solely on 
explaining the effects of the atonement manipulation on perceived forgivability. 
 Costliness was correlated with T3 forgivability and restitution (rs = .61 and .79, ps < 
.001), making mediation of atonement on forgiveness through costliness possible. Because 
restitution conceptually represents perceptions that the offender performed a concrete action 
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aimed at making amends, and costliness conceptually represents the extent to which this action 
was effortful, we tested a model with atonement (No Atone = 0; Atone = 1) as an exogenous 
predictor of restitution, costliness, and forgivability, and restitution as an endogenous predictor 
of costliness and forgivability, with costliness also predicting forgivability. In this model (10,000 
bootstrap resamples), atonement predicted restitution (p < .001), but its direct effect on costliness 
(p = .523) and forgivability (p = .219) were not significant. Restitution predicted both costliness 
(p < .001) and forgivability (p < .001), and costliness predicted forgivability (p = .001). The 
indirect effects of atonement on forgiveness through restitution alone (p = .001), and through 
restitution and costliness (p = .037), were both significant. Thus, atonement worked to influence 
forgivability by increasing perceptions that the offender tried to “make things right.” When 
perceivers saw this action as more costly, forgivability was further increased.  
 To determine whether this model adequately fit the data, the non-significant direct paths 
from atonement to costliness and forgivability were removed, and the model was re-estimated. 
This model fit the data well, χ2(2) = 2.61, p = .272, CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.04, p-close = .402. 
All direct effects were significant (ps < .001; except costliness→forgivability, p = .018). 
Confirming H5, the indirect effect of atonement on forgivability through restitution was 
significant (b = 1.44, CI.95 = 0.78, 2.12, p < .001) as was the path through restitution and 
costliness (b = 0.64, CI.95 = 0.09, 1.18, p = .023; see Figure 3 for all direct path coefficients).  
Discussion 
 The three-part design of Experiment 4 allowed a novel and straightforward examination 
of the process of assigning forgiveness as information unfolded. For example, when participants 
learned of the transgression in Part 2, forgivability significantly decreased below baseline. In 
addition, we demonstrated how repentance and atonement promoted recovery from damage 
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associated with a transgression, and further highlighted the unique role atonement plays in 
promoting full restoration to baseline forgivability. Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that 
efforts aimed at repair, particularly when costly, help explain how atonement can impact U3PF. 
This suggests that third party observers are attentive to the social signals displayed by offenders 
even when personal motives for reconciliations are absent.   
 
 
Figure 3. Indirect effects of Atonement on perceived costliness and forgivability via restitution 
in Experiment 4. Coefficients are unstandardized. *p < .05. **p < .001.   
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CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Theoretical Contributions 
 When blameworthy transgressions occur, what offenders feel and do afterwards 
influences whether they will be forgiven. This is true not only for victims and their close others 
but also for uninvolved third parties who, despite not being harmed, may have tainted 
perceptions of offenders. The current research showed that repentance and atonement uniquely 
increase forgiveness by such observers and that atonement, but not repentance, fully restores 
offenders' forgivability to pre-transgression levels. Unlike previous forgiveness research on 
victims and involved parties, the current work on U3PF tested the effects of repentance and 
atonement independent of motivational concerns for reconciliation. By examining forgiveness 
from this disinterested perspective, we extend prior research and demonstrate that offenders’ 
post-transgression attitudes and actions can transform negative judgments into positive 
responses, resulting in forgiveness from uninvolved third parties who have little reason to care. 
 A second novel contribution we provide regards disentangling repentance from 
atonement and demonstrating the independent effects of offenders’ internal remorse and external 
behaviors aimed at restitution—both of which are implied in apology—on forgivability. 
Separating these concepts is a useful endeavor that should spur further research. People can 
apologize without ever repenting (Ohtsubo et al., 2012) or deceptively express remorse to reduce 
punishment (Hogue & Peebles, 1997). Similarly, people can repent without apologizing or 
informing anyone about their mental states, and behaviors aimed at restitution can exist with or 
without apology or repentance. By empirically isolating the three concepts, the current work 
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contributes to a clearer understanding of how, why, and what parts of apology function to 
promote forgiveness.  
Summary 
 Four studies involving different categories of harm and varying victim-offender 
relationships found converging evidence that repentance and atonement individually influence 
perceived forgivability. In Experiment 1, observers perceived that a TA who communicated 
repentance was more forgivable than a non-repentant one. This effect emerged even though the 
context of the vignette was arguably not relevant to our non-student sample. In Experiment 2, a 
supervisor was forgiven more when she tried but failed to make up for her oversight relative to 
one who did not attempt to atone. Experiment 2, therefore, effectively isolated atonement from 
the positive outcomes typically associated with attempts at restitution, demonstrating the robust 
connection between actions directed at “making things right” and forgivability. Experiment 3 
simultaneously manipulated repentance and atonement, replicated the results of Experiments 1 
and 2 and extended them to a situation with equal power status between the parties. Experiment 
3 also involved severe physical harm, and offender remorse was not communicated to the victim; 
even so, the predicted effects emerged. The effect sizes in Experiments 1-3 also confirmed that 
U3PF relied more strongly on atonement than repentance. Experiment 4 further demonstrated 
that both repentance and atonement facilitate recovery from negative judgments associated with 
a transgression. Moreover, Experiment 4 provided evidence that full restoration relies on 
atonement, and perceived costliness associated with restitution helps mediate the effect of 
atonement on U3PF. Together, these results suggest that offenders’ post-transgression mental 
states and behaviors influence perceived forgivability and that concrete behavior aimed at repair 
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can fully redeem offenders from the taint of transgression, even in the eyes of dispassionate 
observers.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Limitations to the present research should be noted. First, each experiment used 
hypothetical vignettes to describe unintended transgressions. Vignettes allowed us to control the 
information people received about post-transgression attitudes, behaviors, and outcomes and is 
similar to how perceivers might receive information in real contexts. However, the experimental 
setting might have generated responses that differ from how third-party evaluations naturally 
occur in real-life contexts. Second, the current research relied on self-reported measures. 
Although social desirability may not be as critical as it is for the role of victims (Risen & 
Gilovich, 2007), using behavioral or physio-neurological responses could complement our 
conclusions. Third, repentance and atonement may influence perceived forgivability differently 
in other cultural contexts. Because participants in the current experiments were all U.S. residents 
recruited online, further research would be needed to test whether our findings would replicate in 
non-Western populations. We have no reason to believe that the results depend on other 
characteristics of the participants, materials, or context. 
 Several areas for future research seem promising. Our research has focused on third-party 
perceptions of offenders; however, how victims react to the offenders’ repentance and atonement 
is also valuable information for perceivers in evaluating future cooperation partners. For 
example, the third-party deterrence hypothesis is predicated on the idea that observers are 
attentive to the retaliatory capability of victims and adjust their course of actions accordingly 
(dos Santos et al., 2011). Thus, future work might contrast how offenders’ post-transgression 
actions influence third-party perceptions of forgiving and unforgiving victims.  
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 In addition, future U3PF research should address how forgivability may be influenced by 
the degree and type of actions aimed at atonement, as well as offenders’ motives for atonement. 
Just as some types of apologies (e.g., coerced, self-interested) are negatively associated with 
forgiveness (Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004; Zechmeister et al., 2004), perhaps, effective 
atonement requires voluntary action or self-sacrifice. Experiment 4 provided supporting evidence 
for the role of perceived costliness in facilitating U3PF; thus, examining the net cost incurred by 
the atoning agent in light of potential or actual benefits is worth considering. Although smaller 
offers of penance might be equally as effective as larger offers for victims (Bottom et al., 2002), 
uninvolved third parties may be more attentive to the cost offenders are willing to incur to 
reestablish cooperation.   
 Finally, another important question concerns the mental states motivating actions that 
result in harm. Here, all experiments investigated repentance and atonement for unintended 
harms. Will repentance and atonement affect U3PF for foreseen, reckless, or intended 
transgressions? Given that blame is highest when harms are intended (e.g., Malle et al., 2014) 
and criminal justice intuitions regarding rehabilitation rely more on perceptions of the criminal 
than the crime (Petersen et al., 2010), full restoration, if possible in such cases, may require not 
only attempts at reparation but a substantial contribution to the welfare of the victims and their 
community.  
 The current research has not answered all of these questions, but it has provided 
important initial steps in distinguishing the roles of mental states from observable reparative 
actions and in showing how these factors influence forgivability in disinterested contexts. 
Examining third party forgiveness can contribute to our understanding of person perception 
processes that require some degree of objectivity, such as decisions made in criminal justice 
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contexts. In similar ways that people forgive those who trespass against them, so do uninvolved 
perceivers forgive the sins of unknown others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adams, G. S., Zou, X., Inesi, M. E., & Pillutla, M. M. (2015). Forgiveness is not always divine: 
When expressing forgiveness makes others avoid you. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 126, 130-141. 10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.10.003 
Alicke, M. D. (1992). Culpable causation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(3), 
368-378. 
Aquino, K., Tripp, T. M., & Bies, R. J. (2001). How employees respond to personal offense: The 
effects of blame attribution, victim status, and offender status on revenge and 
reconciliation in the workplace. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(1), 52–59. 
https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-9010.86.1.52 
Batson, C. D. (1987). Prosocial motivation: Is it ever truly altruistic? In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), 
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 20, pp.65–122). New York: Academic 
Press. 
Boehm, C. (1987). Blood revenge: The enactment and management of conflict in Montenegro 
and other tribal societies, 2nd edition. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
Boon, S. D., & Sulsky, L. M. (1997). Attributions of blame and forgiveness in romantic 
relationships: A policy-capturing study. Journal of Social Behavior & Personality, 12(1), 
19–44. 
Bottom, W. P., Gibson, K., Daniels, S. E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002). When talk is not cheap: 
Substantive penance and expressions of intent in rebuilding cooperation. Organization 
Science, 13(5), 497-513. doi:10.1287/orsc.13.5.497.7816 
34 
 
Carlisle, R. D., Tsang, J. A., Ahmad, N. Y., Worthington, E. L., Witvliet, C., & Wade, N. (2012). 
Do actions speak louder than words? Differential effects of apology and restitution on 
behavioral and self-report measures of forgiveness. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 
7(4), 294–305. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2012.690444 
Darby, B. W., & Schlenker, B. R. (1982). Children’s reactions to apologies. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 43(4), 742–753. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.43.4.742 
Davis, J. R., & Gold, G. J. (2011). An examination of emotional empathy, attributions of 
stability, and the link between perceived remorse and forgiveness. Personality & 
Individual Differences, 50(3), 392–397. 
de Waal, F. B. M. & van Roosmalen, A. (1979). Reconciliation and consolation among 
chimpanzees. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 5(1), 55–66. 
dos Santos, M., Rankin, D. J., & Wedekind, C. (2011). The evolution of punishment through 
reputation. Proceedings: Biological Sciences, 278, 371-377. 
Drell, M. B., & Jaswal, V. K. (2016). Making amends: Children’s expectations about and 
responses to apologies. Social Development, 25(4), 742–758. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/sode.12168 
Eaton, J., Struthers, C. W., & Santelli, A. G. (2006). The mediating role of perceptual validation 
in the repentance–forgiveness process. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
32(10), 1389–1401. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206291005 
Exline, J. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Expressing forgiveness and repentance: Benefits and 
barriers. In M. E. McCullough, K. I. Pargament, & C. E. Thoresen (Eds.), Forgiveness: 
theory, research, and practice (pp. 133–155). New York: Guilford Press. 
35 
 
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. Evolution and 
Human Behavior, 25(2), 63–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4 
Fincham, F. D., Paleari, F. G., & Regalia, C. (2002). Forgiveness in marriage: The role of 
relationship quality, attributions, and empathy. Personal Relationships, 9(1), 27. 
Finkel, E. J., Rusbult, C. E., Kumashiro, M., & Hannon, P. A. (2002). Dealing with betrayal in 
close relationships: Does commitment promote forgiveness? Journal of Personality & 
Social Psychology, 82(6), 956–974. 
Fischbacher, U., & Utikal, V. (2013). On the acceptance of apologies. Games and Economic 
Behavior, 82, 592–608. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003 
Gold, G. J., & Weiner, B. (2000). Remorse, confession, group identity, and expectancies about 
repeating a transgression. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 22(4), 291–300. 
Green, J. D., Burnette, J. L., & Davis, J. L. (2008). Third-party forgiveness: (Not) Forgiving your 
close other’s betrayer. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(3), 407–418. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207311534 
Harris, Alex H. S., & Thoresen, Carl E. (2005). Forgiveness, unforgiveness, health, and disease. 
In E. L. Worthington (Ed.), Handbook of forgiveness (pp. 321–333). New York: 
Routledge. 
Hashimoto, T., & Karasawa, K. (2012). Victim and observer asymmetries in their reactions to an 
apology: How responsibility attribution and emotional empathy lead to forgiveness. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 51, 104–117. 
Hashimoto, T., & Karasawa, K. (2016). When and by whom are apologies considered? The 
effects of relationship and victim/observer standing on Japanese people’s forgiveness. 
36 
 
Interpersona: An International Journal on Personal Relationships, 10(2), 171–185. 
https://doi.org/10.5964/ijpr.v10i2.214 
Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., …Ziker, J. (2006). 
Costly punishment across human societies. Science, 312(5781), 1767–1770. 
Ho, B. (2012). Apologies as signals: With evidence from a trust game. Management Science, 
58(1), 141–158. 
Hogue, T. E., & Peebles, J. (1997). The influence of remorse, intent and attitudes toward sex 
offenders on judgments of a rapist. Psychology, Crime & Law, 3(4), 249-259. 
doi:10.1080/10683169708410821 
Jeter, W. K., & Brannon, L. A. (2017). “I’ll make it up to you”: Examining the effect of 
apologies on forgiveness. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2017.1291854 
Krasnow, M. M, Delton, A. W, Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2016). Looking under the hood of 
third-party punishment reveals design for personal benefit. Psychological Science, 27(3), 
405-418. doi:10.1177/0956797615624469 
Laurent, S. M., Nuñez, N. L., & Schweitzer, K. A. (2015). The influence of desire and 
knowledge on perception of each other and related mental states, and different 
mechanisms for blame. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 60, 27-38. 
Lawler, K. A., Younger, J. W., Piferi, R. L., Billington, E., Jobe, R., Edmondson, K., & Jones, 
W. H. (2003). A Change of heart: Cardiovascular correlates of forgiveness in response to 
interpersonal conflict. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 26(5), 373. 
37 
 
Lotz, S., Okimoto, T. G., Schlösser, T., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2011). Punitive versus 
compensatory reactions to injustice: Emotional antecedents to third-party interventions. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(2), 477-480. 
Malle, B. F., Monroe, A. E., & Guglielmo, S. (2014). Paths to blame and paths to convergence. 
Psychological Inquiry, 25(2), 251–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2014.913379 
McCullough, M. E. (2008). Beyond revenge: the evolution of the forgiveness instinct (1st ed). 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
McCullough, M. E., Bellah, C. G., Kilpatrick, S. D., & Johnson, J. L. (2001). Vengefulness: 
Relationships with forgiveness, rumination, well-being, and the big five. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(5), 601–610. 
McCullough, M. E., Kurzban, R. & Tabak, B. A (2013). Cognitive systems for revenge and 
forgiveness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(1), 1-15. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11002160 
McCullough, M. E., Rachal, K. C., Sandage, S. J., Worthington Jr, E. L., Brown, S. W., & Hight, 
T. L. (1998). Interpersonal forgiving in close relationships: II. Theoretical elaboration 
and measurement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(6), 1586. 
McCullough, M. E., Worthington Jr., E. L., & Rachal, K. C. (1997). Interpersonal forgiving in 
close relationships. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 73(2), 321–336. 
Miura, S. Y. (2000). The Mediation of conflict in the traditional Hawaiian family: A 
collectivistic approach. Qualitative Research Reports in Communication, 1(2), 19-25. 
Montada, L., & Schneider, A. (1989). Justice and emotional reactions to the disadvantaged. 
 Social Justice Research, 3, 313-344. 
38 
 
Ohbuchi, K., Kameda, M., & Agarie, N. (1989). Apology as aggression control: Its role in 
 mediating appraisal of and response to harm. Journal of Personality & Social 
 Psychology, 56(2), 219–227. 
Ohtsubo, Y., & Watanabe, E. (2009). Do sincere apologies need to be costly? Test of a costly 
signaling model of apology. Evolution and Human Behavior, 30(2), 114–123. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.09.004 
Ohtsubo, Y., Watanabe, E., Kim, J., Kulas, J., Muluk, H., Nazar, G., . . . Zhang, J. (2012). Are 
costly apologies universally perceived as being sincere? Journal of Evolutionary 
Psychology, 10(4), 187-204. doi:10.1556/JEP.10.2012.4.3 
Petersen, M. B., Sell, A., Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2012). To punish or repair? Evolutionary 
psychology and lay intuitions about modern criminal justice. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 33(6), 682-695. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.05.003 
Pipes, R. B., & Alessi, M. (1999). Remorse and a previously punished offense in assignment of 
punishment and estimated likelihood of a repeated offense. Psychological Reports, 85(1), 
246-248. 
Risen, J. L., & Gilovich, T. (2007). Target and observer differences in the acceptance of 
questionable apologies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(3), 418–433. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.3.418 
Rye, M. S., Pargament, K. I, Ali, M. A., Beck, G. L., Dorff, E. N., Hallisey, C., … Williams, J. 
G. (2000). Religious perspectives on forgiveness. In M. E. McCullough, K. I. Pargament, 
& C. E. Thoresen (Eds.), Forgiveness: theory, research, and practice (pp. 133–155). 
New York: Guilford Press. 
39 
 
Schlenker, B. R., & Darby, B. W. (1981). The use of apologies in social predicaments. Social 
Psychology Quarterly, 44(3), 271. https://doi.org/10.2307/3033840 
Scobie, E. D., & Scobie, G. E. W. (1998). Damaging events: The perceived need for forgiveness. 
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 28(4), 373. 
Skarlicki, D. P., Ellard, J. H., & Kelln, B. R. C. (1998). Third-party perceptions of a layoff: 
Procedural, derogation, and retributive aspects of justice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
83, 119–127. 
Skarlicki, D. P., Folger, R., & Gee, J. (2004). When social accounts backfire: The exacerbating 
effects of a polite message or an apology on reactions to an unfair outcome. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 34(2), 322–341. 
Weiner, B., Graham, S., Peter, O., & Zmuidinas, M. (1991). Public confession and forgiveness. 
Journal of Personality, 59(2), 281–312. 
Witvliet, C., Ludwig, T. E., & Vander Laan, K. L. (2001). Granting forgiveness or harboring 
grudges: Implications for emotion, physiology, and health. Psychological Science, 12(2): 
117–123.  
Zechmeister, J. S., Garcia, S., Romero, C., & Vas, S. N. (2004). Don’t apologize unless you 
mean it: A laboratory investigation of forgiveness and retaliation. Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, 23(4), 532–564. 
Zechmeister, J. S., & Romero, C. (2002). Victim and offender accounts of interpersonal conflict: 
 Autobiographical narratives of forgiveness and unforgiveness. Journal of Personality and 
 Social Psychology, 82(4), 675-686. 10.1037//0022-3514.82.4.675 
 
 
40 
 
APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENT 1 STIMULI 
 
 
 In Experiment 1, participants read the vignette described below and then were randomly 
assigned to see either the “No Repent” or “Repent” email from the Teaching Assistant (TA). 
 
 Jamie is a senior in college this year. Jamie has been working diligently in all of her 
classes, but especially in statistics because this class is required for her degree. Even though 
Jaime reviewed her notes and studied hard, she ended up getting a failing grade on the final 
exam. She found out that she needed a few more points to receive a passing grade. So Jaime 
decided to take advantage of an extra credit assignment that would boost her grade, enabling her 
to graduate on time. Two weeks went by after she submitted this assignment and then Jaime got 
the following email message from the graduate teaching assistant for her class.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The TA’s email in the No Repent condition in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 5. The TA’s email in the Repent condition in Experiment 1. 
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENT 2 STIMULI 
 
 
 In Experiment 2, participants read the following scenario and then were randomly 
assigned to read either the “No Atone” or “Atone” version of Part 2.  
 
Part 1 
 Maya has been working as a loan specialist in a bank for 3 years. She is very good at her 
job, consistently receiving positive feedback from her clients on customer surveys. Over the last 
3 years, Maya has also won multiple employee of the month awards, and all of her coworkers 
respect her very much. When Maya recently learned that the bank was opening a new location 
and was looking for an assistant branch manager, she decided to apply for the position. Maya’s 
supervisor, Kayce, agreed to write her a letter of recommendation for the position. Maya was 
very nervous about the result, but her coworkers assured her that she was perfectly qualified for 
the position and that she would most likely get the promotion.  
 
 A week after the deadline for her application, Maya received an email stating that 
although her qualifications were extraordinary, her application for the assistant branch manager 
position was rejected because she did not have a letter of recommendation from her supervisor. 
Evidently, Kayce had missed the deadline for Maya’s application and as a result, Maya was not 
being considered for the position.  Maya was very disappointed. However, she decided not to 
approach Kayce about it, not knowing whether she had changed her mind, assuming that it was 
too late to change anything now anyway, and not wanting to create any friction at work. 
 
Part 2 
 When a coworker noticed that Maya seemed to be feeling down, Maya first said it was 
nothing and not to worry. The coworker then asked whether she had gotten the assistant branch 
manager position she was applying for. At this point, Maya decided to tell her what had 
happened. Afterwards, Maya asked the coworker to keep it to herself because she didn’t want to 
start any trouble with Kayce, who might have had her own reasons for not submitting the letter. 
Although the coworker said she would keep quiet, she decided to say something to Kayce the 
next day. Kayce seemed a little annoyed when she responded, “I thought I had sent it out, but I 
must have overlooked it.”  
 
 No Atone. That afternoon, Kayce was in an unrelated lunch meeting with Gina, the head 
of the hiring committee in charge of finding the assistant branch manager. During their 
conversation, Kayce asked her if the position Maya applied for had been filled yet.  Gina said 
that two finalists had been chosen but no offer had yet been made. Kayce mentioned that she 
thought Maya would have been a good candidate if the committee had received all of her 
materials on time. Gina agreed that Maya would have been a good candidate because of her 
qualifications, but mentioned that it was past the deadline. Kayce said she understood. She did 
not ask Gina to accept her letter late, and consequently, the assistant branch manager position 
was offered to one of the other candidates. 
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 Atone. That afternoon, Kayce was in an unrelated lunch meeting with Gina, the head of 
the hiring committee in charge of finding the assistant branch manager. During their 
conversation, Kayce asked her if the position Maya applied for had been filled yet. Gina said that 
two finalists had been chosen but no offer had yet been made. Kayce, then, explained her 
oversight in failing to send her letter, and asked if the committee would be willing to accept it 
late so they could still consider Maya for the job. Gina mentioned that it was past the deadline 
and she would ordinarily say no, but then reluctantly agreed as a favor to Kayce. Maya’s 
application was reviewed by the committee, but ultimately, the assistant branch manager 
position was offered to one of the other candidates. 
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENT 3 STIMULI 
 
 
 In Experiment 3, participants read the following scenario and then were randomly 
assigned to read either the “No Repent” or “Repent” version of Part 1’s ending, followed by 
either the “No Atone” or “Atone” version of Part 2. 
 
Part 1  
 Jesse, a college student, was riding his bike home in a rainstorm after studying for an 
upcoming final exam at the library. As he was about to cross an intersection where he had the 
right-of-way, he saw a car approaching from the side road, moving too fast for the road 
conditions. Jesse heard the tires of the car skidding but realized in a split second that the driver 
probably would not be able to stop in time. He tried to pedal faster to avoid being hit, but it 
didn’t work. As the car was coming to a stop, the front bumper hit his rear tire, knocking Jesse 
off from his bike onto the ground. The driver got out.  
 
 “Dude, are you OK? In the rain, I didn’t see the stop sign, and didn’t even know you 
were there until I hit your bike,” explained the driver, nervously. Jesse got up slowly, grunting in 
pain and still feeling shaken up.  
 
 “I think I’m OK. My leg hurts a little, but it’s no big deal.” The driver then asked, “Hey, 
don’t I know you? I think you’re in my chemistry class. I’m Chris. You ready for the final?”  
 
 “Yeah, that’s right,” Jesse said. “I’m Jesse. And yeah, I think I’ll pass.”  
 
 “It’s a tough class, for sure,” Chris said. He paused for a moment, then noted, “Your bike 
doesn’t look too good. The back wheel looks bent.”  
 
 “Yeah, I guess it is,” Jesse agreed. “I’ve been meaning to get a new one for a while, 
anyway,” said Jesse, forcing a smile. “Now, I guess I have an excuse to get rid of this one.” 
 
 “Uh, OK,” Chris mumbled. “So…I’ve got to head home and study. Are you sure you’re 
fine?” 
 
 “Yeah. I’ll be OK,” Jesse replied, “I only live like a block from here.”  
 
 “OK,” Chris said. “See you in class, then.” 
 
 Because neither Jesse nor Chris had been involved in a car accident before, they did not 
even consider calling the police and filing an accident report. Chris got back into his car and 
drove away, and Jesse picked up his bike and began walking, limping the whole way home. 
Later that night, when Jesse’s knee swelled up and got so stiff that he couldn’t walk, Jesse 
realized he was hurt more than he thought he was. He called a friend who drove him to the 
hospital. At the hospital, he found out that ligaments in his knee had torn from falling off his 
bike, requiring immediate surgery.  
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 The next day was the chemistry final. Before class began, Chris overheard another 
student explaining something to the professor.  
 “Jesse wanted me to tell you that he won’t be able to take the final exam today,” the 
student said. “I had to take him to the hospital last night. He ended up needing emergency 
surgery on his knee.”  
 
 “That sounds terrible,” the professor said. “What happened?” 
 
 “When he was riding his bike home last night, someone ran a stop sign and ended up 
knocking him off his bike. He tore some ligaments. The doctor said the surgery went well and 
he’ll be OK in about a month.” 
 
 “All right, thanks for letting me know. Tell Jesse I hope he feels better soon, and let him 
know he can take the exam when he’s up and around again.” 
 
 “Yes, I’ll tell Jesse. I’m sure he’ll be relieved. He was saying how worried he was when I 
drove him in.” 
 
 No Repent. Hearing this, Chris didn’t feel particularly bad. He thought to himself, “I 
don’t know why he’s blaming me for what happened…who rides their bike home in the rain 
without any lights or anything? I didn’t even see him. And it’s not my fault I couldn’t stop in 
time. I tried, but the road was super-slippery. And in any case, I didn’t think he was hurt. I just 
bumped into him. And the doctor told him he’ll be fine.” At that point, the professor handed 
Chris his exam. Chris tried to put what he had heard out of his mind and concentrated on the 
final.  
 
 Repent. Hearing this, Chris felt terrible about himself. He thought to himself, “Poor 
Jesse. It was my fault this happened, wasn’t it? I mean, I didn’t even see him…he wasn’t using 
any lights or anything on his bike. Still, Jesse would be here right now if I was driving more 
carefully. I tried to stop in time, but I just couldn’t. The road was super-slippery! I didn’t think 
he was hurt. I only bumped into him…but I guess that was all it took.” At that point, the 
professor handed Chris his exam. Chris tried to put what he had heard out of his mind and 
concentrated on the final. 
 
Part 2 
 That summer, Chris went out to the mall, planning on buying himself a new TV with 
money he had been saving all year. Chris didn’t think his TV was big enough or that it had high 
enough resolution, so he really wanted to treat himself to a new top-of-the-line model. Seeing as 
he had friends over all the time to watch sports and play video games, Chris reasoned to himself 
that it was almost a necessary investment. On the way to the electronics store, Chris happened to 
run into Jesse, who was at the mall to visit the bike store to replace his now-useless bicycle. 
 
 “Hey Jesse,” Chris called. “I heard in class what happened to you after I left that night. 
I’m glad to see that you’re doing OK.” 
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 “Thanks,” said Jesse, recognizing Chris. “Yeah, it was a bummer. I thought I was fine 
when I went home, but I ended up having to get surgery later that night. But luckily, my knee is 
all healed up now so that feels good after a month of wheelchair and crutches. I’m just glad I can 
still walk!”  
 
 “Yeah, that’s good,” Chris said. “Anyway, what are you up to this summer?”  
 
 “The usual,” replied Jesse, “You know, working. Making up class work. And I’m finally 
getting a new bike to replace the old one.” 
 
 No Atone. Chris laughed nervously. “I guess that makes sense. Anyway, I’ve got to head 
out. See you around.” 
 
 Jesse replied, “Yeah, see you.”  
  
 Chris headed off to the electronics store where he shopped around for a while before 
making his purchase. Jesse went to the bike store and bought a new bike. 
 
 Atone. Chris laughed nervously. “I guess that makes sense.” He paused for a moment 
and then said, “You know, why don’t you let me buy your bike for you, seeing as I trashed your 
last one.”   
 
 Jesse replied, “Really? You don’t have to do that. It’s a lot of money.” 
 
 Chris said, “Nah, it’s OK.” 
 
 Jesse said, “I really appreciate that. Thanks!” 
 
 Chris ended up buying Jesse a new bike with the money he had saved and in the end, 
Chris didn’t buy the new TV he really wanted. 
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APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENT 4 STIMULI 
 
 
 In Experiment 4, participants read a story divided into three parts. Parts 1 and 2 were 
identical for all participants, and participants were randomly assigned to read a version of Part 3 
where the offender either repented/did not repent and either atoned/did not atone. 
 
Part 1  
 Alex has been working at his new job for a month. Lately, he’s been working overtime 
because his girlfriend’s (Riley) birthday is coming up next weekend and he wants to surprise her 
with concert tickets for her favorite band. When Alex requests the weekend off, his supervisor – 
who rarely grants new employees time off – agrees because Alex has been working exceptionally 
hard and because he is giving the manager plenty of advance notice.  Alex purchases the concert 
tickets and is thrilled at the thought of how special Riley will feel on her birthday.  
On the day of the concert, however, Alex gets a call from his supervisor asking him to come in to 
work because a co-worker (Casey) who is scheduled to work that day has called in sick. Alex 
reminds his supervisor about the concert and his girlfriend’s birthday, but the supervisor says 
that none of the other employees can be reached and Alex will have to cover. Despite his desire 
to celebrate Riley’s birthday with her, Alex agrees to work that day, fearing that saying no will 
lose him his job. Alex still surprises Riley with the concert tickets but explains the situation to 
her, and suggests that she take a friend instead of him. Although she says she understands and 
thanks him for the concert tickets, Alex senses a hint of disappointment in her as he leaves for 
work.  
 
Part 2 
 Later that night, while waiting for the concert to start, Riley chats with the guy sitting 
next to her and finds out that he works for the same company as Alex.  
 
 “You must have worked really hard to get this day off,” said Riley, “My boyfriend was 
supposed to be here tonight but unfortunately, he had to work.” 
 
 “Actually, I forgot to request the night off, so I ended up calling in sick,” said the guy 
with a chuckle, “but I love this band and I wouldn’t have missed it for the world!” 
 
 “I see,” said Riley, “well the show is about to start…it’s nice meeting you. What was 
your name?” 
 
 “Nice to meet you too,” he said, smiling. “And my name is Casey.”  As it turns out, this 
person was the same one that Alex covered for at work.  
 
Part 3 
 The next day, Alex confronted Casey about faking sickness and how Casey spoiled the 
birthday plans he had with his girlfriend.  
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 No Repent. Casey said, “To be honest, I don’t really feel bad about this. Maybe I should 
have asked for the night off ahead of time, but you could have said ‘no’ to coming in. I really 
enjoyed the concert and I don’t regret calling in.”   
  
 Repent. Casey looked troubled and said, “I feel really bad about this. I never even 
considered that someone would have to cover my shift, but I should have, and should have shown 
up to work yesterday. I know it doesn’t change what happened, but just so you know, I feel pretty 
bad about it.” 
 
*** 
 A few weeks later, Alex and Riley were hanging out when Riley smiled and said, “Are 
you looking forward to our night out tomorrow? I am! Dinner and a movie; it’s been a while.” 
Alex looked confused when he replied, “Tomorrow? I thought you said next week!”  
“No, tomorrow,” Riley said. “Remember? The movie is only playing through tomorrow. Last 
week you said you had requested the night off. I really wanted to see that movie with you.”  
Alex could tell that Riley was getting upset, and felt upset himself. “I’m so sorry…I must have 
mixed the date up, and requested the night off for next week.” He hung his head low for a 
minute, and then raised it slowly, smiling. “I’ve got an idea,”  
Alex said. “Maybe Casey can cover for me! He totally owes me one after your birthday.” 
Alex called Casey and explained the problem, asking him if he would cover his shift. “You’d 
really be helping me out if you could,” added Alex.  
 
 No Atone. Casey replied that he couldn’t because he had a friend coming in from out of 
town that night. “We already have plans to just hang out and relax tomorrow,” Casey said. “I 
really can’t. My friend is only going to be in town for a few days, so tomorrow really doesn’t 
work for me. You know how it is.” Riley was understandably upset, as was Alex, who worked his 
shift because he needed the job. Riley didn’t want to see the movie alone, so she stayed home that 
night. 
 
 Atone. Casey replied that he couldn’t because he had a friend coming in from out of 
town that night. “We have plans to just hang out and relax,” Casey said, “so tomorrow really 
doesn’t work.” At that point, Casey paused, then said, “You know what, though? My friend will 
be in town for a few days, so I can cover for you. I certainly owe you one.” Riley was 
understandably happy, as was Alex. The next day, Casey covered Alex’s shift as promised, and 
Alex and Riley went out to dinner and saw the movie. They both had a great time. 
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APPENDIX E: SUPPLEMENTARY MEASURES 
 
For Experiments 3 and 4, in addition to the variables reported in the main text, we also 
explored whether our manipulations would affect three related variables: moral judgment of the 
transgressors, desire to punish transgressors, and negative affect. Below, we describe the 
supplementary measures used in Experiments 3 and 4. Unless otherwise noted, all items were 
measured with 7-point scales (1=entirely disagree, 7=entirely agree). 
 
Moral Judgment 
 
For Experiment 3, moral character was measured with one item (reverse-coded): “Where 
would you rate Chris on the following scale?” (1=not a very immoral person, 7=a very immoral 
person).  
 
For Experiment 4, moral judgments were measured with two items that assessed the 
extent to which the offender was moral (i.e., moral character) and how moral the offender’s 
action was (i.e., moral act). Both items were reverse-coded so that higher numbers indicated less 
immorality: “Where would you rate Casey on the following scale?” (1=not a very bad person, 
7=a very bad person), and “How do you view what Casey did? Casey calling in sick to work 
was…” (1=not at all bad, 7=very bad). The moral judgment items were presented at Time 1, 
Time 2, and Time 3 following the forgivability items. The two items at each time point were 
aggregated into a single measure of moral judgment.  
 
Desire to Punish 
 
In Experiment 3, desire to punish was measured with two items: “Chris deserves to be 
punished,” and “How much punishment does Chris deserve for what he did?” (1=none at all, 
7=quite a lot).  
 
In Experiment 4, three items measured desire to punish: “If I were the supervisor and 
found out what Casey did, I would punish him for it,” “Casey should have to pay for calling in 
sick and making Alex have to work,” and “Casey deserves punishment for messing up Alex’s 
plans for his girlfriend’s birthday.”  
 
Negative Affect 
 
For Experiments 3-4, negative affect was measured with two items: “[Chris’s/Casey’s] 
behavior makes me angry,” and “reading this story made me mad.” 
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APPENDIX F: ADDITIONAL SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
 
We collected additional demographic information for each experiment. After completing 
primary measures in each experiment, participants provided demographic information in addition 
to those reported in the main text, summarized in Table 3. For the majority of participants, 
English was their native language. Religious backgrounds were mixed; responses to two 
questions, “How religious are you?” (1=not at all religious, 7=very religious) and “How 
important is religion to you in your everyday life?” (1=not at all important, 7=extremely 
important) were aggregated as a measure of religiosity. Ideologically, the sample was diverse in 
response to the question: “Where would you place yourself on the following ideological 
spectrum?” (1=extremely liberal, 4=middle of the road, 7=extremely conservative). 
 
Table 3. Additional demographics (Experiments 1 to 4) 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
English Native 97.3%  95.5%  97.2%  98.1% 
Political Orientation      
     M and SD 3.51 (1.79)  3.45 (1.78)  3.48 (1.81)  3.45 (1.85)  
Religiosity      
     Reliability (r) .96  .92  .93 .95  
     M and SD 3.37 (2.25) 3.28 (2.28)  2.98 (2.16)  2.81 (2.14)  
Religion     
    Atheism 11.2% 15.3% 17.0% 22.8% 
    Agnosticism 15.5% 7.2% 12.1% 17.1% 
    Buddhism 2.1% 3.6% 3.5% 0.6% 
    Christianity 50.8% 54.1% 45.4% 43.0% 
    Hinduism 1.1% 0.0% 1.4% 3.2% 
    Judaism 2.7% 0.9% 2.8% 1.3% 
    Islam 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.6% 
    Other 16.6% 18.9% 16.4% 11.4% 
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APPENDIX G: SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
 
 
Here, we report additional results and analyses that provide converging evidence and 
serve to supplement the primary findings presented in the main text. Below, we present the 
summary statistics on the supplementary variables and report analyses of supplementary 
measures for Experiments 3-4. 
 
Experiment 3 Results 
 
 
Table 4. Experiment 3 means, standard deviations, and reliabilities for supplementary measures. 
 
  No Repent Repent 
  No Atone Atone No Atone Atone 
Measures α/r M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
      
Moral Judgment - 2.75 (1.55) 4.18 (1.32) 3.66 (1.66) 3.94 (1.65) 
Desire to Punish .80 4.98 (1.49) 3.40 (1.58) 4.71 (1.43) 3.13 (1.31) 
Negative Affect .81 5.41 (1.53) 3.68 (1.68) 4.93 (1.56) 2.85 (1.62) 
N  32 40 38 31 
 
 
Table 5. Experiment 3 results for supplementary measures. 
 
Measures F(1, 137) p d/ (η2p) 
    
Moral Character    
 Repent 1.63 .203 0.15 
 Atone 10.60 .001 0.53 
 Repent  Atone 4.82 .030 (0.03) 
Desire to Punish    
 Repent 1.21 .273 0.06 
 Atone 40.86 < .001 1.07 
 Repent  Atone 0.00 .995 (0.00) 
Negative Affect    
 Repent 5.68 .019 0.24 
 Atone 49.41 < .001 1.13 
 Repent  Atone 0.41 .522 (0.00) 
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Experiment 4 Results 
 
 
Table 6. Experiment 4 means, standard deviations, and reliabilities for supplementary measures. 
 
  No Repent Repent 
  No Atone Atone No Atone Atone 
Measures α/r M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
      
Time 1 Moral Judgment .81 4.71 (1.32) 4.74 (1.68) 5.00 (1.54) 4.77 (1.85) 
Time 2 Moral Judgment .69 2.32 (0.87) 2.16 (1.11) 2.42 (1.26) 1.89 (1.15) 
Time 3 Moral Judgment .57 2.06 (0.85) 3.26 (1.21) 2.57 (1.41) 3.77 (1.18) 
Desire to Punish .86 5.27 (1.02) 4.83 (1.41) 5.20 (1.44) 4.33 (1.70) 
Negative Affect .79 5.32 (1.26) 5.00 (1.41) 5.04 (1.79) 4.65 (1.57) 
N  39 40 38 41 
 
 
Table 7. Experiment 4 results for supplementary measures. 
 
Measures F (1, 154) p d/(η2p) 
    
Time 3 Moral Judgment    
 Repent 7.23 .008 0.39 
 Atone 41.08 <.001 1.01 
 Repent  Atone 0.00 .991 (0.00) 
Moral Recovery (Time 3–Time 2)    
 Repent 12.40 .001 0.47 
 Atone 85.14 <.001 1.42 
 Repent  Atone 1.27 .262 (0.01) 
Moral Restoration (Time 3–Time 1)    
 Repent 1.54 .216 0.20 
 Atone 22.43 <.001 0.76 
 Repent  Atone 0.24 0.626 (0.02) 
Desire to Punish    
 Repent 1.60 .207 0.21 
 Atone 8.40 .004 0.46 
 Repent  Atone 0.90 .344 (0.01) 
Negative Affect    
 Repent 1.72 .191 0.21 
 Atone 2.18 .142 0.24 
 Repent  Atone 0.02 .881 (0.00) 
 
